The literature on the impact of economic instruments (typically taxes and tradable permits) on the level of innovation is usually based on the assumption that innovation reduces the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. This assumption, which usually leads to the conclusion that taxes induce higher levels of innovation than tradable permits, is however never motivated. In this short article, we analyse the assumption by introducing innovation in the production function of a polluting firm and by showing how it affects the corresponding marginal abatement cost curve. We show that the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve does not necessarily decrease with the level of innovation. As a consequence, previous analyses lead to misleading policy recommendations. 
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Weitzman (1974) , the debate on whether polluting emissions should be controlled via prices or quantities (tradable permits) is still very active. Many contributions have looked at ways of deciding between them. These include the degree of uncertainty on the costs or the bene…ts of the control, the characteristics of the pollution problem at stake (e.g. ‡ow versus stock pollution), etc.
When dealing with pollution problems, the development of more environmentally friendly technologies is often considered as being crucial. Decision makers are therefore akin to know the extent to which the use of an instrument enhances the incentives to innovate, and in particular which of the two main instruments (taxes and tradable permits) leads to the highest degree of innovation.
In a recent survey article, Ja¤e et al. (2002) summarize the main …ndings on this issue: "... both auctioned and freely-allocated permits are inferior in their di¤usion incentives to emission tax systems. Under tradable permits, technology di¤usion lowers the equilibrium permit price, thereby reducing the incentive for participating …rms to adopt" (p. 53).
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In fact, such a result crucially depends on the assumption that marginal abatement costs decrease with the level of innovation. This is the standard assumption made in the literature, such as for instance in Downing and White (1986) , Fischer et al. (2003) , Goulder and Mathai (2000) , Jung et al. (1996) and Milliman and Price (1989) . However, none of these contributions o¤er any justi…cation for its use. Fischer et al. (2003) simply state "Assuming innovation reduces marginal abatement costs is standard in the literature ..." (p. 526) while Jung and Krutilla (1996) write "At the …rm level, we follow previous literature in assuming that technology adoption can be modeled simply as a decline in marginal abatement costs over a relevant region..." (p. 97) and quote Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Price (1989) who do not o¤er any justi…cation for it.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse such an assumption. We do so by introducing innovation in the production function of a polluting …rm, which can be done in several alternative ways, and by rigorously deriving its marginal abatement cost curve. We observe that, under the most standard ways of accounting for innovation, the slope of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves does not necessarily decrease with the level of innovation. Hence, we question here the relevance of such a so commonly made assumption and, by the same token, the policy recommendations that derive from its use.
This article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we show, in a very simple set up, how the assumption of decreasing marginal abatement costs leads to the result stated above, i.e., there will be more innovation under taxes than under tradable permits, at least when the regulator does not react to the innovation. Section 3 gathers our main analyses: we introduce, in two standard alternative ways, innovation in the production function of a …rm and we show how it a¤ects the corresponding MAC curve. Our result, that MAC curves do not necessarily decrease with innovation, is then discussed in Section 4.
Marginal abatement costs and innovation: the usual assumption and its implications
By de…nition, the M AC curve associates to every level of emissions (or emission reductions) the cost of reducing the emissions by an additional unit (see Figure  1 ). 2 This cost comes from the substitution towards cleaner inputs and from a decrease in revenues (decrease in output). Let e be the emissions level characterizing the laissez-faire situation. Then, the total abatement costs to reduce emissions from e to b e is the area under the MAC curve between e and b e. The regulator can control …rms emissions either by imposing a tax t on emissions or by allocating a total quantity b e of tradable emission permits. In Figure  1 , these are chosen in such a way that both instruments lead to equivalent outcomes -in terms of prices and quantities-(under certainty and before innovation takes place). If it is assumed that innovation simply decreases the slope of the MAC curve (from M AC to M AC 0 ), as it is done in the literature mentionned above, then abatement costs are saved through the adoption of the new technology. The amount of abatement costs saved by adopting the innovation depends on the instrument. It amounts to areas 1 and 2 under the tax system but only to area 1 under the tradable permits scheme. In fact, the equilibrium level of emissions after innovation is no longer the same under both instruments. Under the tax regime, the equilibrium level of emissions decreases while, under the tradable permits, the level of emissions is still given by the total amount of permits, but the permits price goes down.
Thus, regulated …rms are willing to pay more for a given new technology under the tax scheme than under the tradable permits system. Accordingly, the rents that an innovator may expect to capture from the sales of its new technology are larger under the tax than under the permits, and therefore the level of innovation is higher under the tax regime. Let us now describe how innovation is likely to a¤ect the production function of a polluting …rm and thus the corresponding MAC curve of that …rm.
Framework
Let us adopt the following notation. A …rm produces the good y by mean of two inputs, x, which represents energy, and k, which represents capital (or a bundle of all non energy inputs). The emissions are denoted by e. We make the following two additional assumptions: the production function is of a CobbDouglas type and the level of emissions is linearly related to the amount of energy used the …rm. 6 Hence:
where A, and are positive parameters with + < 1 (decreasing returns), and :
comprehensive presentation, see for instance Fischer et al. (2003) . 6 Our analysis can easily be performed with a one factor production function characterised by general (convexity) properties. In this article, we have chosen to enrich the analysis by accounting for two inputs in order to capture substitution e¤ects. To that purpose, we use the Cobb-Douglas function since it is very often used in economic applications and because the aim of this short article is to question an established assumption rather than to derive a new general result.
We consider two types of innovation. The …rst one corresponds to the development of new end-of-pipe devices (tail-end cleaning equipment). Such a technology has the property to reduce the ratio emissions/input. The second one is the familiar increase in e¢ ciency. The investment in end-of-pipe cleaning equipment is simply modeled by an increase in the positive parameter a while the increase in e¢ ciency corresponds to an increase in the positive parameter A. 
Derivation of the MAC curves
In order to derive the MAC curve, we follow the standard technique (see for instance Montgomery (1972 ) or McKitrick (1999 ). We compute the total abatement costs by subtracting the pro…t level at a given (constrained) level of emissions from the pro…t level at the laissez-faire equilibrium (no constraint on emissions).
Let us …rst characterise the unconstrained situation, i.e., the baseline. The problem of the …rm is max k;x 0 y rk qx (3) subject to (1) and (2) where r and q are the prices of capital and energy respectively. The …rst order condition w.r.t. k leads to :
so that (3) can be rewritten :
The function is globally concave and admits a unique maximum at :
(6) Baseline pro…ts and emissions are thus equal to :
Let us now consider the problem of the …rm when its level of emissions is constrained, i.e: e ê:
Note that such a constraint is binding only ifê < e: Then, the corresponding levels of energy consumption and pro…ts are :
The Total Abatement Cost (TAC) curve is the di¤erence between constrained and baseline pro…ts for di¤erent levels of the emission constraints :
In the present framework, for a given technology, the …rm reduces its emissions by both reducing its output and substituting capital to energy. Indeed, for decreasing levels of the constraintê; b y = A (ab e) 1 1 increases. The TAC curve measures the costs associated with both processes.
The Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is then de…ned as the derivative of the TAC curve w.r.t. the level of the constraint :
These two functions are de…ned on the interval [0; e] : Given the shape of (x) (see (5)), M AC is a positive convex function ofê; decreasing from +1 to 0 (see Figure 2 hereafter).
Innovation and the slope of the MAC curve
The M AC function depends on the state of technology through the parameters a and A: To see how the MAC function is modi…ed by changes in these parameters, we take the partial derivatives of M AC w.r.t. to these parameters. Thus, we have:
We know that the pro…t function de…ned by (5) is globally concave and admits a unique maximum at x (de…ned by (6)). Thus,
so that A > q: However, 1 < 1 because of decreasing returns of scale, so that @M AC=@a can be positive or negative. In the left neighbourhood of e; M AC is close to 0, as shown in Figure 2 , so that A q; which gives @M AC=@a < 0: This is consistent with the fact that @e=@a > 0 (which follows from (8)). Moreover, for decreasing values of b e; @M AC=@a is increasing and tends to in…nity. So for b e "su¢ ciently" The economic intuition is the following. An increase in a has two e¤ects. Given x (which does not depend on a), the …rst e¤ect consists in a decrease of the baseline emissions (e), which means, other things being equal, a lower e¤ort to comply with the objective (b e), thus a lower cost to emit b e. The second e¤ect follows from the fact that the innovation translates into a more e¢ cient baseline from an environmental point of view (i.e., characterised by higher capital/emissions and output/emissions ratios). Ceteris paribus, all further measures to meet b e are thus more costly w.r.t. the previous baseline, so that the MAC curve becomes steeper.
Let us now consider an increase in A: From (9), it is clear that 8ê; @M AC=@A > 0: Furthermore, given (8) and (6), it is also clear that @e=@A > 0: So an increase in the productivity parameter A translates into a shifting of the MAC curve to the upper right, with an extension of its domain. This is depicted in Figure 2 -2. The economic intuition is the following. An increase in A implies in increase of the global productivity of inputs, which induces the …rm to produce more and to use more inputs (a.o. energy). Accordingly, the baseline emissions (e) increase. Thus the cost (the loss of pro…ts to realise a certain objective b e) is higher, so that the MAC curve shifts to the right.
Discussion
By introducing innovation in the production function of a polluting …rm in two standard ways, we have shown that an increase in the level of innovation does not necessarily and solely lead to a decrease of the slope of the corresponding
